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A NOTE ON INTRINSIC CORRELATION
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STANFORD GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS
Abstract. In this note we characterize the strategic implication
of intrinsic correlation, introduced by Brandenburger and Frieden-
berg (2008), in the subjective correlated equilibrium setting of a
complete information game. Intrinsic correlation restricts correla-
tion devices to variables within the game, i.e. players’s beliefs (and
higher order beliefs) about each other’s strategies, in contrast to
signals or sunspots from the “outside.” The characterization is
a strengthening of best-response set with an injectivity condition
for a certain subset identified by an iterative procedure. We also
give an iterative procedure, analogous to the iterated removals of
dominated strategies, that arrives at strategies consistent with our
characterization, which always exist.
1. Introduction
Correlation is a natural and important concept in game theory. In
non-cooperative game theory, the combined implication of correlation
and rationality is first analyzed by Aumann (1974) with his solution
concept of correlated equilibrium.
Very recently, Brandenburger and Friedenberg (2008) introduced a
subtle classification on correlations in non-cooperative games: they can
be intrinsic, coming from correlation devices that are players’s beliefs
(and higher order beliefs) about each other’s strategies, or extrinsic,
which means that there is no restriction on the correlation devices;
Brandenburger and Friedenberg use the abjective extrinsic because
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such correlations are usually interpreted as correlations from signals
and sunspots that are not explicitly specified in the game.
There is a large literature on the strategic implications of extrinsic
correlation, for example the study of correlated equilibrium in one-
shot games and in dynamic games (well-known and needs not to be
cited), of correlations from observations in adaptive heuristics (Hart
and Mas-Colell (2000)), correlations from robustness considerations in
information structure (Kajii and Morris (1997), Morris and Ui (2005)),
etc.
This note contributes toward understanding the strategic implica-
tions of intrinsic correlation in one-shot, complete information game. In
particular, we provide an exact characterization of strategies played in
a subjective correlated equilibrium when all correlations are restricted
to be intrinsic. Our characterization is inspired by the injetivity con-
dition in Brandenburger and Friedenberg (2008) and can be seen as
a generalization of injectivity from first order beliefs to higher order
bliefs. We also give an iterative procedure, analogous to the iterated
removals of dominated strategies, that arrives at strategies consistent
with our characterization, which always exist.
2. Set-up
From now on we fix a finite, complete information game: (u,A,N),
where N is the set of players (|N | ≥ 2), A = ∏i∈N Ai the set of strategy
profiles, and ui : A → R, i ∈ N , the payoffs. All of our definitions,
constructions and results are stated with respect to this game.
We work with type spaces that captures strategic uncertainty: (Ti, λi, σi)i∈N ,
where Ti is a finite or countably infinite set of types of player i, λi :
Ti → ∆(T−i × A−i) are i’s belief, contingent on his type, about types
and strategies of other players, and σi : Ti → Ai is i’s pure strategy
contingent on type.
We are interested in type space and strategies (Ti, λi, σi)i∈N that
form a subjective correlated equilibrium, with all correlations being
intrinsic; this is formalized by the following three conditions: for every
i ∈ N and every ti ∈ Ti,
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(A-1) σi(ti) ∈ argmaxa′i∈Ai ui(a′i,margA−i λi(ti))
(A-2) λi(ti)[t−i, a−i] = (margT−i λi(ti))[t−i] · δσ−i(t−i)(a−i), for1 all t−i ∈
T−i and a−i ∈ A−i.
(A-3) each ti ∈ Ti induces a distinct belief hierarchy; that is, there is
no redundant type in Ti, using the terminology of Mertens and
Zamir (1985).
Definition 2.1. (Ti, λi, σi)i∈N is a subjective correlated equilibrium if
(A-1) and (A-2) are satisfied.
(Ti, λi, σi)i∈N is a subjective equilibrium with intrinsic correlation
(s.e.i.c.) if (A-1), (A-2) and (A-3) are satisfied.
Condition (A-1) says that every type of every player is maximizing
according to his belief. (A-2) says that this belief is compatible with
others’ type-contingent strategies. Since this belief can be correlated,
(A-3) requires the source of correlation to be belief hierarchies, which
formalize the notion of higher order beliefs.
Here is an example of redundant types, which (A-3) rules out.
Example 2.2. Consider the following symmetric type space with two
players. N = {1, 2}, with types T1 = T2 = {s, t}, and strategies A1 =
A2 = {a, b}. Let σ1(s) = σ2(s) = σ1(t) = σ2(t) = a. And let λ1 and λ2
be such that λ1(s)[t, a] = λ2(s)[t, a] = 1 and λ1(t)[s, a] = λ2(t)[s, a] = 1.
Notice that λi(s) 6= λi(t) for each i ∈ N . Nevertheless, for both
players, type s and type t have the same belief hierarchy: their first
order beliefs are both with probability one on strategy a; and they both
believe (with probability one) that strategy a is played and the other
believes so, thus the same second order belief, and so on.
One interpretation in support of non-redundant types (and thus of
intrinsic correlation) is that the players in an complete information
game can only reason about non-redundant types, so an analysis re-
lying on the presence of redundant types introduces an uncomfortable
asymmetry between the analyst and the players in the game. Of course,
1δσ−i(t−i) is the degenerate probability measure concentrated on σ−i(t−i), i.e.
δσ−i(t−i)(a−i) = 1 if σ−i(t−i) = a−i, and 0 otherwise.
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this is not the case if the redundant types are actually physical signals
like stop lights, but such signals, as they are not modeled as a part of
strategies, must come from outside of the game.
3. Characterization
It is well-known (e.g. Brandenburger and Dekel, 1987) that for any
set of strategy (Qi)i∈N , there exists a subjective correlated equilibrium
(Ti, λi, σi)i∈N such that Qi = σi(Ti) for every i ∈ N , if and only if
(Qi)i∈N is a best-response set; that is, if and only if for each i ∈ N
and ai ∈ Qi, there exists a (perhaps correlated) belief µ ∈ ∆(Q−i) such
that ai is a player i’s best response to µ. We now characterize the
additional strategic implications of insisting on non-redundant types
(condition (A-3)).
We first define the best-response correspondence,
BRi(µ) := {ai ∈ Ai : ui(ai, µ) ≥ ui(a′i, µ) ∀a′i ∈ Ai},
for each i ∈ N and µ ∈ ∆(A−i).
For a fixed (Qi)i∈N , where each Qi ⊆ Ai, let
βi(ai) := {µ ∈ ∆(Q−i) : ai ∈ BRi(µ)}, ai ∈ Qi,(1)
βi(Ci) :=
⋃
ai∈Ci
βi(ai), Ci ⊆ Qi,
for every i ∈ N . βi(ai) is simply the set of correlated beliefs that
support strategy ai (for which ai is a best response for player i).
When βi(ai) = {µ}, we simply write βi(ai) for µ.
And for each i ∈ N , let
W 1i := {ai ∈ Qi : |βi(ai)| = 1},(2)
W li := {ai ∈ W 1i : βi(ai)[W l−1−i ] = 1}, l ≥ 2,
Wi :=
⋂
l≥1
W li .
W 1i is the set of strategies in Qi that has an unique supporting belief.
W 2i is the subset of W
1
i for which the unique supporting belief has
support contained in W 1−i =
∏
j 6=iW
1
j , and so on.
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Theorem 3.1. For any (Qi)i∈N , where each Qi ⊆ Ai, there exist a
s.e.i.c. (Ti, λi, σi)i∈N such that Qi = σi(Ti) for each i ∈ N , if and
only if for every i ∈ N , for each ai ∈ Qi, βi(ai) 6= ∅, and for each
ai 6= a′i ∈ Wi, βi(ai) 6= βi(a′i).
Brandenburger and Friedenberg (2008) points out that in games with
generic payoffs, if Qi is the set of player i’s strategies that survive
iterated deletions of strictly dominated strategies, then W 1i is empty
for every player. Thus, as shown in their Proposition H.2 and H.3,
in these generic games, the set of strategies played under some s.e.i.c.
equals the set of strategies played under some subjective correlated
equilibrium. This can also be seen in the statement of the theorem
above: if W 1i is empty, so is every Wi, so each βi is automatically
injective over Wi, and the condition simply becomes best-response set.
However, even in these generic games, the set of strategies played under
a fixed subjective correlated equilibrium needs not to be exactly the
set of strategies played under any s.e.i.c.; it may be a strict subset.
Example 3.2. Consider the following symmetric two-person game:
A B C D
A 1, 1 3, 3 0, 0 0, 4
B 3, 3 1, 1 0, 4 0, 0
C 0, 0 4, 0 1, 1 1, 1
D 4, 0 0, 0 1, 1 1, 1
First, note that {A,B,C,D} × {A,B,C,D} is a best-response set, so
every strategy is under a subjective correlated equilibrium.
Let Q1 = Q2 = {A,B,C,D}. Then β1(A) = β1(B) = β2(A) =
β2(B) = {1/2A+1/2B}. Thus, W1 = W2 = {A,B}, and the conditions
of Theorem 3.1 fail for (Q1, Q2).
In fact, using Theorem 3.1 it is easy to see that A or B can be played
by either player under no s.e.i.c. Thus, s.e.i.c. refines away a weakly
dominated Nash equilibrium (1/2A+ 1/2B, 1/2A+ 1/2B).
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4. Iterative Procedure and Existence
In this section we give an iterative procedure that arrives at the set
of strategies played under a s.e.i.c. We will show that this iterative
procedure always gives a non-emtpy set, thus there always exists a
s.e.i.c. in every finite game.
For each i ∈ N , let R1i be the the set of player i’s correlated ra-
tionalizable strategies, or equivalently, the set of player i’s strategies
surviving iterated removals of strictly dominated strategies.
Now inductively, for l ≥ 2, let βl−1i and Wi(l−1) be, respectively, the
βi and Wi obtained in Equations (1) and (2) when Qi = R
l−1
i , i ∈ N .
And for each i ∈ N and γ ∈ βl−1i (Wi(l−1)), fixed an al−1(γ) ∈ Wi(l−1)
such that βl−1i (a
l−1(γ)) = γ; note that if βl−1i is injective, there is an
unique choice for al−1(γ).
For each i ∈ N , let
Rl,1i :=
(
Rl−1i \Wi(l − 1)
) ∪ {al−1(γ) : γ ∈ βl−1i (Wi(l − 1))},(3)
Rl,ki := {ai ∈ Rl,1i : ∃µ ∈ ∆(Rl,k−1−i ) s.t. ai ∈ BRi(µ)}, k ≥ 2,
Rli :=
⋂
k≥1
Rl,ki .
Finally, let
Ri :=
⋂
l≥1
Rli
for each i ∈ N .
Notice that for each i ∈ N we have
R1i ⊇ R2i ⊇ R3i ⊇ . . . ⊇ Ri.
Theorem 4.1. For each i ∈ N , Ri is non-empty. Moreover, there
exist a s.e.i.c. (Ti, λi, σi)i∈N such that Ri = σi(Ti) for every i ∈ N .
Proof. The second part in obvious, given Theorem 3.1.
A NOTE ON INTRINSIC CORRELATION 7
To prove that Ri’s are non-empty, we define a sequence of smaller
iterating sets for each i ∈ N :
S1i := R
1
i ,
for l ≥ 2 :
Sl,1i := S
l−1
i \Wi(l − 1),
Sl,ki := {ai ∈ Sl,1i : ∃µ ∈ ∆(Sl,k−1−i ) s.t. ai ∈ BRi(µ)}, k ≥ 2,
Sli :=
⋂
k≥1
Sl,ki ,
Si :=
⋂
l≥1
Sli,
where Wi(l− 1) (and βl−1i ) here are obtained in Equations (1) and (2)
when Qi = S
l−1
i (a slight abuse of notations).
Clearly, we have S1i ⊇ S2i ⊇ . . . ⊇ Si and Sli ⊆ Rli for each l ≥ 1 and
i ∈ N . Thus, it suffices to show that each Sli is non-empty.
It is well-known that each of S1i = R
1
i is non-empty.
Now for a fixed l ≥ 2, suppose each of Sl−1i is non-empty. By
Lemma 4.2, for a fixed i ∈ N we have an a¯i ∈ Ai such that a¯i is
i’s best response to multiple beliefs in Sl−1−i . Clearly, a¯i ∈ S1i . And for
2 ≤ k ≤ l− 1, we have a¯i ∈ Ski because a¯i /∈ Wi(k− 1) by construction
and a¯i is i’s best response to a belief with support in S
l−1
−i ⊆ Sk,m−i for
any m ≥ 1. Thus, we have a¯i ∈ Sl−1i \Wi(l − 1) = Sl,1i 6= ∅.
For a fixed m ≥ 2, suppose each Sl,m−1i is non-empty. Fix an i ∈ N .
Let µ ∈ ∆(Sl,m−1−i ) be an arbitrary belief, and choose any a˜i ∈ BRi(µ).
We will show that a˜i ∈ Sl,mi 6= ∅, which finishes the proof.
We have a˜i 6∈ Wi(k − 1) for each 2 ≤ k ≤ l; suppose otherwise, then
we must have βk−1i (a˜i) = µ, which is impossible, because the support
of µ is contained in Sl,m−1−i , and the support of β
k−1
i (a˜i) is contained
in W−i(k − 1). And a˜i ∈ Sk,ni (where n ≥ 2 arbitrary when k < l,
and 2 ≤ n ≤ m when k = l) because the support of µ is contained in
Sl,m−1−i ⊆ Sk,n−1−i . 
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Lemma 4.2. For a fixed player i ∈ N and any non-empty Qj ⊆ Aj,
j 6= i, there exists an a¯i ∈ Ai such that a¯i is player i’s best response to
at least two distinct beliefs in Q−i.
Proof. Let C be the convex hull,
C := {(ui(µi, a−i))a−i∈Q−i : µi ∈ ∆(Ai)} ⊆ RQ−i .
Let x be any extreme point of C that is not weakly dominated by
any other point in C; that is, x is an extreme point of convex set C,
and there is no y ∈ C \{x} such that y(a−i) ≥ x(a−i) for all a−i ∈ Q−i;
there exists a weakly undominated extreme point in C, because C is a
convex hull of its extreme points, and z ∈ C is not weakly dominated in
C if and only if there exists some µ ∈ ∆(Q−i) such that suppµ = Q−i
and µ · z ≥ µ · y for all y ∈ C. Clearly, there exists an a¯i ∈ Ai such
that x = (ui(a¯i, a−i))a−i∈Q−i . This a¯i satisfies our desired conclusion
because x is a weakly undominated extreme point of C, so there must
be multiple hyperplanes separating C − x = {y − x : y ∈ C} from the
positive orthant RQ−i+ . 
We include {al−1(γ) : γ ∈ βl−1i (Wi(l−1))} in Rl,1i because the result-
ing Ri is a maximal (in the set-inclusion order) set of strategies played
under a s.e.i.c. Furthermore, they are canonical, in the sense that for
any s.e.i.c., by some choice of al−1(γ) for each l and γ, we will have
σi(Ti) ⊆ Ri for each i ∈ N .
5. Proof of Theorem 3.1
5.1. Only if. Fix a s.e.i.c. (Ti, λi, σi)i∈N ; let Qi := σi(Ti) for each
i ∈ N .
Clearly for every i ∈ N and ai ∈ Qi, βi(ai) 6= ∅.
If Wi = ∅ for every i ∈ N , then there is nothing else to prove. Thus,
suppose otherwise; note that this implies that Wi 6= ∅ for all i ∈ N .
Our desired conclusion follows from the following lemma.
Lemma 5.1. For any i ∈ N and ai ∈ W li , l ≥ 1, there is at most one
l-th order belief in Ti mapped by σi to ai; that is, if σi(ti) = σi(t
′
i) = ai,
then ti and t
′
i has the same l-th order belief.
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Proof. If σi(ti) = ai ∈ W 1i , ti ∈ Ti, then margA−i λi(ti) = β(ai) by
condition (A-1) combined with |β(ai)| = 1. Thus the lemma is true
when l = 1.
Now suppose that σi(ti) = σi(t
′
i) = ai ∈ W 2i , ti, t′i ∈ Ti. Then,
margA−i λi(ti) = margA−i λi(t
′
i) = β(ai) because ai ∈ W 1i . If βi(ai)[a−i] >
0, λ(ti)[t−i, a−i] > 0 and λ(t′i)[t
′
−i, a−i] > 0 , then we must have
σ−i(t−i) = σ−i(t′−i) = a−i because of condition (A-2); and a−i ∈ W 1−i
because ai ∈ W 2i . Thus, by the previous paragraph, tj must have the
same first order belief as t′j for each j 6= i; this is precisely saying that
ti and t
′
i have the same second order belief.
The general induction step is completely analogous to the above. 
Corollary 5.2. For every i ∈ N and µ ∈ ∆(W−i), there can be at
most one type in Ti having first order belief µ, i.e. margA−i λi(ti) =
µ = margA−i λi(t
′
i)⇒ ti = t′i.
Proof. Suppose µ ∈ ∆(W−i) and margA−i λi(ti) = µ, ti ∈ Ti. The
previous lemma together with conditions (A-2) and (A-3) implies that,
for every a−i ∈ suppµ, we have λi(ti)[t−i, a−i] = µ(a−i), where tj is
the unique type in Tj such that σj(tj) = aj, j 6= i. Thus, by the
non-redundancy of Ti, ti is unique in Ti. 
Now, for each i ∈ N and ai 6= a′i ∈ Wi, by the assumption of
Qi = σi(Ti), there exists ti 6= t′i ∈ Ti such that σi(ti) = ai and σi(t′i) =
a′i. Because of condition (A-1), we have margA−i λi(ti) = βi(ai) and
margA−i λi(t
′
i) = βi(a
′
i); and clearly βi(ai)[W−i] = βi(a
′
i)[W−i] = 1.
Then βi(ai) 6= βi(a′i), for otherwise the corollary above would imply
that ti = t
′
i.
5.2. If. We will prove this direction by construction.
Suppose for each i ∈ N and ai ∈ Qi, βi(ai) 6= ∅, and for each i ∈ N
and ai 6= a′i ∈ Wi, βi(ai) 6= βi(a′i).
For each i ∈ N , let
Xi = {ai ∈ Qi \Wi : |βi(ai)| = 1}
Yi = {ai ∈ Qi \Wi : |βi(ai)| > 1}
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Clearly, we have Qi = Xi ∪ Yi ∪ Wi. And note that we also have
Xi = W
1
i \Wi and Yi = Qi \W 1i .
For each i ∈ N and ai ∈ Yi, fix b(ai) 6= c(ai) ∈ βi(ai) \ βi(Wi ∪Xi)
such that |{b(ai) : ai ∈ Yi} ∪ {c(ai) : ai ∈ Yi}| = 2|Yi|. This is possible
because |βi(ai)| > 1⇒ |βi(ai)| =∞, for βi(ai) is convex.
Notice that βi(Xi)∩βi(Wi) = ∅: if βi(ai) ∈ βi(Wi) and ai ∈ Xi, then
clearly we must have ai ∈ Wi, which cannot happen by construction.
For each i ∈ N , we let
Ti := βi(Wi) ∪
⋃
µ∈βi(Xi)
{µ(1), . . . , µ(Kµ)} ∪
⋃
ai∈Yi
{b(ai), c(ai)},
where Kµ = 2|BRi(µ) ∩ Qi| for each µ ∈ βi(Xi); and µ(1), . . . , µ(Kµ)
are Kµ copies of µ.
The intuition and the essence of this type space is as follows. For
every ai ∈ Wi, type βi(ai) will have first order belief βi(ai). Likewise,
for every ai ∈ Yi, type b(ai) (respectively, c(ai)) will have first order
belief b(ai) (respectively, c(ai)). And for every µ ∈ βi(Xi) and 1 ≤ k ≤
Kµ, type µ(k) will have first order belief µ.
By the way we picked these beliefs, we have that types in Ti \⋃
µ∈βi(Xi){µ(1), . . . , µ(Kµ)} are distinguished from each other by their
first order beliefs. And for any fixed µ ∈ βi(Xi), each µ(k), 1 ≤ k ≤ Kµ,
is also distinguished from types in Ti \{µ(1), . . . , µ(Kµ)} by its first or-
der belief as well. We will define the belief of each µ(k) on other types
such that µ(k)’s are distinguished from each other by their higher order
beliefs.
We first define the strategy σi : Ti → Ai. For each i ∈ N , let
σi(βi(ai)) := ai for every ai ∈ Wi; this is where we used the assumption
that βi is injective among Wi. And let σi(b(ai)) = σi(c(ai)) := ai
for every ai ∈ Yi. Finally, for every µ ∈ βi(Xi), suppose BRi(µ) ∩
Qi = {a(1), . . . , a(n)} (n = Kµ/2 by definition), let σi(µ(2k − 1)) =
σi(µ(2k)) := a(k) for each 1 ≤ k ≤ Kµ/2.
Then clearly we have Qi = σi(Ti) for each i ∈ N .
And a final piece of construction before defining the beliefs λi. For
every i ∈ N , let t(ai) := βi(ai) if ai ∈ Wi, t(ai) := b(ai) if ai ∈ Yi; let
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t(ai) := µ(k) and s(ai) := µ(k + 1) for ai ∈ Xi, where µ = βi(ai) and
σi(µ(k)) = σi(µ(k + 1)) = ai, 1 ≤ k < Kµ.
For each i ∈ N , define the belief λi : Ti → ∆(T−i × A−i) as follows.
For every α ∈ Ti \
⋃
µ∈βi(Xi){µ(1), . . . , µ(Kµ)}, let
λi(α)[t−i, a−i] :=
α(a−i) t(aj) = tj for all j 6= i0 otherwise
for all t−i ∈ T−i and a−i ∈ Q−i. Then clearly, each type α ∈ Ti \⋃
µ∈βi(Xi){µ(1), . . . , µ(Kµ)} has a distinct first order belief α.
Now for any µ ∈ βi(Xi), we must have µ(W−i) < 1, so there exists
a smallest l ≥ 1 such that suppµ 6⊆ W l−i. Pick a dm ∈ Qm such that
m 6= i, (margAm µ)[dm] > 0 and dm 6∈ W lm.
If l = 1 (i.e. |βm(dm)| > 1), then let
λi(µ(k))[t−i, a−i] :=

µ(a−i) am 6= dm, and t(aj) = tj for all j 6= i
k−1
Kµ−1µ(a−i) am = dm, tm = b(am), and t(aj) = tj for all j 6∈ {i,m}
Kµ−k
Kµ−1µ(a−i) am = dm, tm = c(am), and t(aj) = tj for all j 6∈ {i,m}
0 otherwise.
for all t−i ∈ T−i, a−i ∈ Q−i and 1 ≤ k ≤ Kµ.
If l > 1, let
λi(µ(k))[t−i, a−i] :=

µ(a−i) am 6= dm, and t(aj) = tj for all j 6= i
k−1
Kµ−1µ(a−i) am = dm, tm = t(am), and t(aj) = tj for all j 6∈ {i,m}
Kµ−k
Kµ−1µ(a−i) am = dm, tm = s(am), and t(aj) = tj for all j 6∈ {i,m}
0 otherwise.
By induction on l, we can easily show that each µ(k), 1 ≤ k ≤ Kµ,
has a distinct (l + 1)th order belief.
Therefore, condition (A-3) is satisfied. It is readily checked that
conditions (A-1) and (A-2) hold as well. And we have noted before
that Qi = σi(Ti) for each i ∈ N .
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6. Conclusion
We have characterized the set of strategies played under a s.e.i.c. and
showed by an iterative procedure that it is always non-empty. Some
interesting questions for the future include the relationship and inter-
action between intrinsic correlation and common prior, and intrinsic
correlation in dynamic games.
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